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APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). This appeal was 
poured over from the Utah Supreme Court on September 4, 1998. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment as to each of appellant's claims. The court 
reviews summary judgment for correctness, without deference to the trial court. The court 
"determine[s] only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the 
trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v. State, 784 
P.2dl49, 151 (Utah 1989). 
The issues raised on summary judgment were as follows: 
1. Whether the undisputed facts demonstrate that, as a matter of law, Schulman 
owed no duty of care to appellant capable of supporting a negligence claim. Standard of 
Review: correction of error. Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Whether the undisputed facts demonstrate that, as a matter of law, appellant failed 
to establish an element of the claim for abuse of process. Standard of Review: correction of 
error. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 
1990). 
3. Whether the undisputed facts demonstrate that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs 
claims for slander of title/wrongful lien were moot. Standard of Review: correction of error. 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, 789 P.2d at 25. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real property, who 
causes or has caused a document asserting that claim to be recorded or filed in the office of the 
county recorder, who knows or has reason to know that the document is forged, groundless, or 
contains a material misstatement of false claim, is liable to the owner or title-holder for $1,000 or 
for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as 
provided in this chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct such document of record 
within 20 days from the date of written request from the owner or beneficial title-holder of the 
real property. This chapter is not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or materialmen's liens. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-2 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property the plaintiff 
at the time of filing the Complaint or thereafter, and the defendant at the time of filing his answer 
when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record 
with the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of 
the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or 
defense, and a description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing 
such notice for record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be 
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only its pendency against 
parties designated by their real names. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case: This is an action to recover attorney fees allegedly incurred by 
reason of the recording of a lispendens on appellant's property. Appellant and defendant Allison 
Abizaid were divorced in California in 1989. Schulman, a California attorney, later represented 
Abizaid in a post-divorce proceeding to enforce the divorce decree. One of the issues raised in 
the post-divorce proceedings was the disposition of certain community property in Salt Lake 
County. Schulman caused a lis pendens to be recorded on that property because it was purchased 
with community funds. Schulman later filed a motion in the California proceedings to, among 
other things, restrain plaintiff from disposing of or encumbering that property. The grounds for 
that motion were that the property was community property under California law (having been 
purchased with community funds). A restraining order was issued, and the lis pendens was 
released. 
Course of proceedings and disposition below: Appellant brought this action against 
Schulman and Abizaid, complaining that the recording of the lis pendens was negligent, an abuse 
of process and was slander of title or a wrongful lien. Appellant later stipulated to a dismissal of 
the claims against Abizaid. On cross-motions for summary judgment, where appellant conceded 
the material facts, the court denied appellant's motion and granted Schulman's cross-motion. A 
copy of the order is in the appendix as Exhibit A. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Preamble: The material facts were not disputed. As required by rule 4-501(2)(A) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Schulman's opening summary judgment memorandum 
began with a properly supported statement of undisputed facts. Plaintiffs opposition 
memorandum did not challenge any of those facts and stated instead that "[t]he core or operative 
facts of the case are agreed upon and are not in material dispute." (R. 346). Accordingly, the 
following facts were not disputed. UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. 4-501(2)(B). 
1. Schulman was the attorney for Allison Abizaid from May 5, 1995 to January 10, 
1996 in the California divorce case styled In re the Marriage of Allison Abizaid, petitioner and 
David Winters, respondent (case no. D88-06750). (R. 321). 
2. Schulman was retained by Abizaid to enforce a judgment and decree of divorce in 
the above-referenced action. A copy of the divorce decree is included at R. 259-60. (R. 321, 
338). 
3. After the divorce, appellant used funds obtained from a second mortgage on 
California community property to purchase his Utah property. (R. 321, 337). 
4. It was Schulman's opinion that Abizaid had a community interest in that property 
based on California law. In 1992, Abizaid quit claimed her interest in the Utah property to 
appellant pursuant to an agreement by which he would refinance the Utah property and pay 
Abizaid amounts owing under the divorce decree. It was because of that express promise that 
Abizaid would be paid that she agreed to quit claim her ownership interest in the Utah residence. 
A 
Her community interest remained, however, because the property was purchased with 
community funds which had not been repaid. (R. 321-22, 337-38, 256). 
5. On October 20, 1995, Schulman filed a motion in the California proceedings on 
behalf of Abizaid for attorneys fees, sanctions, determination of amounts due and enforcement of 
judgment of the dissolution of the marriage. (R.322, 252). 
6. The specific relief requested in the California motion was, among other things, 
that "the court order a lien against [appellant's] real property in Utah until said sum, plus any 
attorneys fees and sanctions, are paid in full." (R. 322). 
7. Abizaid further requested in that motion an order restraining appellant from 
borrowing against or otherwise disposing of his Utah property until he had fully paid and 
satisfied the terms of the judgment of dissolution of the marriage. (R. 322, 256, 254) 
8. In anticipation of filing the California motion, Abizaid signed and Schulman 
caused to be recorded a lis pendens on appellant's Utah property. (R. 322, 338-39). A copy of 
the lis pendens is at R. 277. 
9. The lis pendens was authorized by rule 1219 of the procedural rules under 
California's family code. The lis pendens was used because the California proceedings were 
brought to protect Abizaid's community interest in the Utah property. Schulman had and has no 
personal interest in appellant's property. (R. 322). 
10. In December of 1995, Schulman and Abizaid were named as co-defendants in this 
action. On January 10, 1996, Schulman was forced to withdraw as counsel for Abizaid in the 
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California proceedings because of a potential conflict of interest in light of the action against 
both of them. (R. 322-23). 
11. Appellant filed a memorandum and an affidavit in opposition to the California 
motion. Copies of those opposition papers are at R. 280 and 292. (R. 323). Schulman filed on 
behalf of Abizaid a reply memorandum in support of the California motion, along with a second 
affidavit. (R. 323). Copies of that reply and the affidavit are at R. 302 and 307. (R. 323). 
12. On April 19, 1996, a hearing was held in the California proceedings during which 
the court ordered that the lis pendens be released. (R. 323). A copy of the court's order from 
that hearing is at 313. (R.323). The court order also granted Abizaid's request for a restraining 
order on appellant's Utah property under CAL. FAM. CODE § 2045. (R. 313, 323, 340). 
13. On April 23, 1996, appellant filed in this action a motion for partial summary 
judgment specifically requesting that the lis pendens be released and requesting attorneys fees. 
(R.323, 55). That motion was supported by a memorandum, appellant's affidavit and an affidavit 
of counsel. Copies of those papers are at R. 55, 90, 107. 
14. The hearing in the California matter was continued until May 31, 1996 to decide 
the issue of attorney fees. (R. 323). Both parties had motions for fees, but each party was 
ultimately ordered to pay their own fees. (R. 323, 248). 
15. At the May 31, 1996 hearing, the California court vacated the restraining order on 
the Utah property. The court also ordered that a $10,000 payment owed to Abizaid be secured by 
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a deed of trust on the Utah property. (R. 323, 315, 249). A copy of the order from the May 31, 
1996 hearing is at R. 315. (R. 323). 
16. Because Schulman had to substitute new counsel for Abizaid in the California 
proceedings after this action was filed, she could have no further involvement in the case after 
withdrawing on January 10, 1996. She could not take any action to release the Us pendens on the 
Utah property. (R. 324, 249). 
17. When Schulman advised the recording of the lis pendens on the Utah property, 
she did so in Abizaid's best interest. The California court ultimately granted the motion and 
issued an order restraining appellant from encumbering or otherwise disposing of his Utah 
property. (R. 324, 249, 307). 
18. The court later lifted the restraining order and ordered that a trust deed be placed 
on that same property to secure payment to Abizaid for the very funds she was seeking in the 
California motion. (R. 324, 249). 
19. Schulman has never been a plaintiff in an unsuccessful action, or any other action, 
against appellant. She gave the advice concerning the lis pendens in good faith and pursuant to 
California law based on Abizaid's community property interest in the Utah property. (R. 324, 
249). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT THE 
MATERIAL FACTS WERE UNDISPUTED. 
The mechanics of opposing a summary judgment motion are precise. When the moving 
party establishes a set of facts based on citations to the record (in this case affidavits), the 
opposing party must demonstrate, also with citations to the record, that the material facts are 
disputed. Here, appellant did not bother to try and dispute Schulman's properly supported 
statement of facts. Appellant essentially stipulated to those facts. The trial court's first task on 
summary judgment—assuring an undisputed record—was easy. The trial court thus did not err 
in concluding that the facts were undisputed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT 
APPELLANT'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FAILED BECAUSE SCHULMAN 
DID NOT OWE APPELLANT A DUTY OF CARE. 
A duty of care is a question of law. It turns on a number of factors, but its core is whether 
there is any particular obligation between the plaintiff and the defendant. It is not, as appellant 
suggests, an abstract question of courtesy. Nor can a duty be conjured merely because lawful 
conduct results in inconvenience to another. Schulman represented appellant's ex-spouse in post 
divorce proceedings. Her duty was to her client, not appellant. She took steps to protect her 
client's undisputed community property interests. Inconvenience to appellant in the context of 
those proceedings is to be expected. It does not give rise to a duty of care. Without a duty, there 
is no negligence as a matter of law. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT 
APPELLANT'S ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM FAILED BECAUSE THE 
CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE CLAIM WAS MISSING. 
Abuse of process requires a prior unsuccessful and meritless action in which the plaintiff 
in the abuse of process claim was the successful defendant. That never happened. Schulman 
represented Abizaid in a proceeding to enforce a divorce decree. Schulman was not the plaintiff 
in that matter. And, incidentally, the prior matter was successful. The California court granted 
Abizaid's request that appellant be restrained from encumbering or disposing of the Utah 
property. Only then was the lis pendens ordered released (long after Schulman's withdrawal, 
which was necessitated by this action). Without that foundational element, appellant's abuse of 
process claim failed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS WERE M O O T AFTER THE CALIFORNIA COURT 
ORDERED THE RELEASE OF THE LIS PENDENS AND ENTERED ITS 
RESTRAINING ORDER. 
After this action was filed, the California court heard arguments regarding the lis 
pendens. That court ordered that the lis pendens be released and that appellant was restrained 
from encumbering or transferring the Utah property. The court also denied appellant's claim for 
attorney fees. That ruling, which resulted in the restriction on the Utah property, mooted 
appellant's claims that the lis pendens clouded or interfered with his title or use of the property. 
The Utah court was then unable to grant relief for slander of title or wrongful lien because the 
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California court ruled essentially that title to or possession of that property was in issue in the 
California proceedings. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT APPELLANT'S 
"TITLE CLAIMS" FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Appellant labeled one of his claims as "quiet title," but apparently thought the better of 
it—given that Schulman did not claim an interest in title—and argued slander of title and 
wrongful lien. The trial court rejected the claim because it was moot. The court ruled that when 
the lis pendens was released (notably, before appellant brought his summary judgment motion, 
the denial of which forms part of this appeal) and appellant was restrained from disposing of his 
property, the court was unable to grant the relief appellant requested. That is the essence of 
mootness. 
The trial court's reasoning was sound and was surely informed by the California court's 
ruling. The California proceedings resulted in precisely the relief requested there: a restraining 
order preserving the Utah property and then ultimately a trust deed on that property securing the 
sum owed Abizaid. Appellant's claim that his title was slandered or liened wrongfully ended 
when the California court decided that it was not. The trial court could not adjudicate damages 
for an allegedly slanderous lis pendens when the lis pendens served its intended purpose (notice 
of the California proceedings) and was then released. 
m 
VI. THIS COURT CAN AFFIRM ON ANY GROUNDS, INCLUDING 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND PRIVILEGE. 
Schulman also argued that the claims regarding the lis pendens were barred by collateral 
estoppel and privilege. Collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues already decided. The 
issue driving the California proceedings was appellant's Utah property. The parties briefed the 
propriety of looking to that property for relief, and appellant specifically attacked the use of the 
lis pendens. The California court granted Abizaid's motion that appellant be restrained from 
disposing of or encumbering the Utah property. The California court denied appellant's request 
for attorney fees incurred in litigating that issue. It is that issue and those fees that are driving 
this case. The trial court's summary judgment can be affirmed on the grounds of collateral 
estoppel. 
A second available basis for affirmance is privilege. Schulman's recording of the lis 
pendens, which merely republishes the pleadings in the underlying case, was privileged. If the 
underlying action relates to title to real property, a lis pendens is appropriate. Not recording one 
when community property interests are asserted is surely malpractice. Because Abizaid's 
requested relief in the California proceedings was a restraining order, based on her undisputed 
community property interest, title or possession was indeed affected. The lis pendens gave 
notice. Recording it was, therefore, privileged. 
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VII. APPELLANTS OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
With little coherency, appellant offers a slew of arguments attacking the lis pendens. Each fails. 
The first lis pendens was recorded in Salt lake County, where the property is located. Second, 
the California court, having jurisdiction over the parties, properly adjudicated their community 
property interest. Third, because of her community property interests, Abizaid was permitted to 
use a lis pendens to give notice of the California divorce action. Finally, the wrongful lien 
statute does not apply. Schulman never claimed an interest in the Utah property, and the lis 
pendens did not contain any material misstatement or false claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT THE 
MATERIAL FACTS WERE UNDISPUTED. 
Opposition to a summary judgment motion requires "a concise statement of material facts 
as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences 
of the movant's facts that are disputed." UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. 4-501(2)(B). Unless 
specifically controverted in this way, the properly supported facts "shall be deemed admitted..." 
Id. 
Schulman's summary judgment memorandum contained a separately numbered statement 
of facts with record citations. (R. 321-24). Appellant did not attempt a single refutation. He 
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essentially conceded the facts. (R. 346)("The core or operative facts of the case are agreed upon 
and are not in material dispute."). Accordingly, the trial court ruled correctly in that the material 
facts were not disputed. (R. 396). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT 
APPELLANT'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FAILED BECAUSE SCHULMAN 
DID NOT OWE APPELLANT A DUTY OF CARE. 
Absent a duty of care, there is no negligence as a matter of law, and summary judgment is 
appropriate. Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 
1994). "Duty is 'a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a 
particular plaintiff . . . ." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989), quoting W. Page 
Keeton et aL, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 356-57 (5th ed. 1984). 
"It has long been held, with few exceptions, ... that the obligation of an attorney is to his 
client and not a third party." Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Utah 1979).1 In 
Hughes, a defendant in a negligence action brought a third party claim against an attorney 
alleging that the attorney's negligence created the liability for which the defendant was being 
sued. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the third-party claim because there was no duty 
running from the attorney to the third party plaintiff. Id. This is the rule. See 61 A.L.R. 4th 615 
(1988) 
1
 The exceptions referred to are based on a theory of third-party beneficiary relationship between 
the client and the third party. A classic example is the beneficiary under a will who loses out 
because the will was negligently drafted. See 61 A.L.R. 4th 615 (1988). 
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It is undisputed that Schulman was the attorney for Abizaid. She did not represent 
appellant. (R. 321, 338(H 11), 324, 249). As a matter of law, she did not owe appellant a duty of 
care. Appellant's attempt to support his claim with the Utah Rules of Professional conduct is 
ridiculous. Schulman is a California attorney. Furthermore, those rules "are not designed to 
create a basis for civil liability." Archuleta v. Hughes, 353 UTAH ADV. REP. 17, 19 (October 2, 
1998), citing Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1291 n.3 (Utah App. 1996), 
cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). Accordingly, summary judgment on the negligence 
claim was correct.2 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT 
APPELLANT'S ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM FAILED BECAUSE THE 
CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE CLAIM WAS MISSING. 
Abuse of process is the use of a legal process "primarily to accomplish a purpose for 
which it is not designed...." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah App. 
1989). A claim for abuse of process "requires that the [prior] proceedings have terminated in 
favor of the person against whom they were brought." Id., citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 674(b) (1977). This last element means that the plaintiff in an abuse of process claim 
2
 The same result is reached using ordinary agency rules. An attorney is the agent for the client. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 195 n.3 (Utah App. 1993). An agent is ordinarily immune if 
acting for the principal and in the principal's interests. See Royal Resources v. Gibraltar Fin. 
Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 795 (Utah 1979); Peterson v. Worthen Bank and Trust Co., 753 S.W.2d 
278, 279 (Ark. 1988). Schulman acted on behalf of Abizaid and to protect Abizaid's community 
property interests when she brought the motion in the California proceedings and recorded the lis 
pendens. (R. 338, 347, 249). 
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must have been a successful defendant in a prior action. See Baird v. lntermountain School Fed. 
Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976). 
An attorney is not liable for abuse of process if there is a reasonable basis for the 
proceedings. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674, comment d. Moreover, attorneys are not 
liable for abuse of process even if they are "convinced [the] client's claim is unfounded," so long 
as they act "primarily for the purpose of aiding [the] client in obtaining a proper adjudication of 
[the] claim." Id. 
The main problem with appellant's abuse of process claim is that he did not defend, let 
alone successfully, any prior action in which Schulman was a plaintiff. (R. 324, 249). He was, 
instead, a respondent in a California divorce proceeding, and Schulman was the opposing 
attorney. (R. 321, 322, 324, 249). The second problem is that appellant could not dispute 
Abizaid's community property interest in the Utah property. (R. 321, 337-39, 256). There was, 
therefore, a reasonable basis for the lis pendens. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS WERE MOOT AFTER THE CALIFORNIA 
COURT ORDERED THE RELEASE OF THE LIS PENDENS AND 
ENTERED ITS RESTRAINING ORDER. 
"If the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the case is 
moot...." Cingolani v. UP&L, 790 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Utah App. 1990), quoting Black v. Alpha 
Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1982). Here, the lis pendens was released more than a year 
and a half before appellant filed his motion. (R. 313, 340, 180). 
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Plaintiffs claims were moot the moment the California court ordered the lis pendens 
released and, in the same order, replaced it with the restraining order. (R. 313). Appellant's 
property was ultimately encumbered by a trust deed in favor of Abizaid. (R. 315). There was no 
wrongful lien or other title-related claim left after the California court encumbered appellant's 
property. The lis pendens did not encumber appellant's property. It merely gave notice of an 
action that resulted in an encumbrance - precisely the purpose of a lis pendens. Hansen, 550 P2d 
at 190; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-2. 
V. THIS COURT CAN AFFIRM ON ANY GROUNDS, INCLUDING 
PRIVILEGE AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
An appellate court can affirm on any proper grounds. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 
(Utah 1995). At least two other grounds recommend themselves. Both were argued in the trial 
court. 
A. The act of causing the lis pendens to be recorded was privileged. 
Because a lis pendens merely republishes pleadings in an underlying action, the recording 
of a lis pendens is absolutely privileged. Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1976). 
"A party to a private litigation ... has an absolute privilege to disparage another's property in or 
the quality of his land...in the institution of or during the course and as a part of a judicial 
proceeding in which he participates if the disparagement has some correlation thereto." Id., 
quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 638. "[Because] the publication of the pleadings is 
absolutely privileged, the republication thereof... is similarly privileged." 550 P.2d at 190. 
1£ 
Attorneys enjoy the same privilege. "An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to 
publish false and defamatory matter of another in communications ... in the institution of, or 
during the course and as part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has 
some relation thereto." Price v. Armour, 949 P2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997), quoting Beezley v. 
Hansen, 286 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1958).3 
Three elements must be satisfied for this judicial proceeding privilege to attach: 
(1) The statement must have been made during or in the course of a 
judicial proceeding; 
(2) The statement must have some reference to the subject matter of the 
proceeding; and 
(3) The statement must have been made by someone acting in the 
capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel. 
Price, 949 P2d at 1256. 
The lis pendens gave notice of the California action—the divorce proceedings between 
Abizaid and appellant. (R. 277). The property at issue was, as argued by appellant, purchased 
after the divorce was final. But it was purchased with community funds. (R. 337, 338, 321 flf 3). 
Under California law—the law governing the divorce proceedings—the court retained 
continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate community property rights. 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to award community estate assets . . . to the parties 
that have not been previously adjudicated by a judgment in the proceeding. A party may file a 
post-judgment motion or order to show cause in the proceeding in order to obtain adjudication of 
any community estate asset or liability omitted or not adjudicated by the judgment. 
3
 Beezley relied on the first restatement of the law of torts, § 586. See Price 949 P2d at 1256. 
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CAL. FAM. CODE § 2556. 
Schulman advised the recording of the lis pendens to give notice of Abizaid's undisputed 
community property interests. (R. 324, 322, 248, 338-39). The basis for the claim against 
appellant's Utah property was that it was purchased with community funds, and title was 
originally held by appellant and Abizaid. (R. 321-22, 337). Property derived from community 
property remains community property. Marriage of Hicks, 211 Cal.App.2d 144, 152-53 (Cal. 
App. 1962). 
Therefore, the lis pendens was used for its proper purpose—it gave notice that the 
California proceedings affected appellant's property. The California court ultimately agreed, 
restraining appellant from transferring or encumbering that property, (R. 323 fl[ 12), 313), and 
later ordering the trust deed to secure the payments to Abizaid. (R. 315).4 
B. Appellant's claims were barred by collateral estoppel. 
Collateral estoppel, bars the "relitigation . . . of issues actually tried in a prior action, and 
it may be invoked even though the subsequent cause of action is different from the former." 
Robertson v. Campbell 61A P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983).5 
Collateral estoppel attaches when the following four requirements are met: 
4
 Under CAL. FAM. CODE § 2045, the court may issue an order "restraining any person from 
transferring, encumbering...or in any way disposing of any property, real or personal, whether 
community, quasi-community, or separate, except in the usual course of business...." The entire 
privilege analysis is not even triggered, however, when the underlying conduct is not tortious. 
Sampson v. Richins, 110 P.2d 998, 1003, n.2 (Utah App. 1989). 
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First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must 
be final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, 
fairly, and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who 
is precluded from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first 
action or a privy of a party. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988), citing Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1374 
(Utah 1988). 
Appellant argued when he opposed the California motion that the lis pendens was 
improper. (R. 287-90). Although the California court released the lis pendens, it granted 
Abizaid's motion for a restraining order. The California proceedings affected title or possession 
to appellant's property, just as the lis pendens stated, because it has community property and the 
court there used that property to secure the post-divorce obligations to Abizaid. (R. 313, 315, 
340(H19)). 
Appellant also sought attorney fees in the California proceedings based on his claim that 
the lis pendens was improper. (R. 290, 340). In addition, appellant claimed attorney fees based 
on the lis pendens from April 1, 1995 through the end of November, 1997. (R. 237, 242). The 
California court, however, ordered a release of the lis pendens on April 19, 1996, and restrained 
any disposition of appellant's property. (R. 313). Knowing that, appellant incurred $4,000 of his 
fees in May of 1996, after the California court entered its order. (R. 242, 313). Fees based on 
the lis pendens were already denied in California. (R. 323, 248). 
3
 Collateral estoppel, "more accurately described as the issue preclusion branch of the doctrine of 
res judicata, "prevents the re-litigation of particular issues, as opposed to causes of action." See 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
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VI. APPELLANT MAY NOT ARGUE ON APPEAL ISSUES NOT 
PRESERVED BELOW. 
An appellant's brief must include a statement of the issues and a citation to the record 
demonstrating that each issue was preserved for appeal. UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5). Issues not 
preserved in the trial court cannot be argued on appeal. See Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 
P.2d 1155, 1158 n.9 (Utah App. 1994)(discovery rule argument to toll statute of limitations not 
argued at trial was not preserved for appeal). Only exceptional circumstances—such that it is 
impossible to raise the issue below—warrant appellate consideration of issues not preserved. 
State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah App. 1995). 
Appellant failed to demonstrate the preservation of any of the issues. (Appellant's brief 
at 1-2). More importantly, two of the issues raised were in fact not preserved. Appellant appears 
to argue that mootness and privilege—arguments raised in Schulman's summary judgment 
motion—were not pled as affirmative defenses and thus could not be argued at summary 
judgment. (Appellant's brief at 2, f 7, and at 27, 41). 
Appellant may not appeal on this issue. The arguments of mootness and privilege were 
raised by Schulman in support of her cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 331 (mootness), 
327-29 (privilege). Instead of objecting, appellant argued the merits of these issues. (R. 356-57 
(mootness), 349-54 (privilege). Appellant cannot now charge error to the trial court for 
considering the issues he elected to argue. Appellant wastes the effort in arguing the privilege 
issue; that issue was not a basis (at least not expressed by the court) for the summary judgment. 
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Furthermore, it is doubtful that mootness is an affirmative defense. Affirmative defenses 
descend from the common law "confession and avoidance." 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1270, at 411 (2d ed. 1990). A defendant is obligated to plead, if 
available, the listed defenses in rule 8(c). UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(c). Mootness is not one of them, 
and it is not a matter "constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." Id. 
Mootness does not suggest that the plaintiff states a prima facie case but that recovery is 
otherwise barred. It is instead consumed in the denials of the particular allegations and the 
defense of failure to state a claim (R. 36); which is to say that the plaintiff never reaches a prima 
facie claim because the court is powerless to grant the requested relief. The "requested judicial 
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants . . . ." Cingolani, 790 P.2d atl222.6 
VII. APPELLANT'S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Appellant argues that, with respect to a lis pendens, the underlying action must be 
pending in the county where the property is located. (Appellant's brief 16, 24). There is no 
authority for such a statement. The statute requires only that the underlying action affect title to 
or possession of real property. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-2. The only requirement—and it was 
met here—is that the lis pendens be recorded in the same county as the property. Id 
6
 Moreover, the answer was filed on April 16, 1996. (R. 35). The hearing in California that 
resulted in the restraining order on the Utah property was held on April 19, 1996. (R. 313). So 
the results of the hearing were not yet known, but the case became moot as of the date of the 
order. 
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Because the Utah property was community property, the California court had jurisdiction 
to adjudicate rights to it. It does not matter that it is located in Utah. Had appellant failed to 
obey the California court's judgment, Abizaid would then have had to bring it to Utah as a 
foreign judgment and seek enforcement here. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22a-l, et sec. But that 
does not affect the community property rights adjudicated by the California court. 
Appellant contends this case is controlled by Busch v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432 (Bkrtcy. D. 
Utah 1992). It is not. Busch was a dispute over sale proceeds from real property, not a claim of 
community interest in the real property itself. Id. at 436. Here, appellant acquired the property 
with community funds, making it community property under California law. Marriage of Hicks, 
211 Cal.App.2d at 152-53. 
That community property interest was never lost because Abizaid never relinquished it. 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581 (there is a presumption of community property interests that can be 
rebutted by either a clear statement in the deed or by "a written agreement that the property is 
separate property.") Abizaid was entitled to assert that interest and, with the lis pendens, give 
notice of that assertion. 
All property held in joint title is community property "regardless of the date of 
acquisition of the property or the date of any agreement affecting the character of the property [.] 
[These rules] apply in all proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1984." CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 2580(c). It is undisputed in this case that the Utah property was originally held by 
Abizaid and appellant as joint tenants, having been purchased with community funds. (R. 321, 
337,218 (Tf 12). 
Appellant contends that the lis pendens was a wrongful lien. (Appellant's Brief at 32-
33). First, the statute refers only to a "person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance 
against, real property . . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (before amendments). Schulman, of 
course, never claimed any interest in appellant's property. (R. 322 (f 9), 248 (^ f6). The rest of 
the wrongful lien statute does not apply because the lis pendens did not contain a "material 
misstatement or false claim . . . " § 38-9-1. Appellant concedes the central fact that the property 
was purchased with community funds (R. 218, 346, 321). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's case is a set of facts in search of a legal theory. The undisputed facts, 
however, demonstrate that there is no basis for the claims. The negligence and abuse of process 
claims fail because the most critical elements are missing. At each turn, appellant runs squarely 
into the undisputed fact that he purchased the Utah property with community funds, cloaking that 
property with community interests. Abizaid was entitled to assert that interest in the post-divorce 
proceedings. The lis pendens merely gave notice of the California divorce action, and properly 
so inasmuch as it concerned as-yet unadjudicated community property. Any disposition of the 
property was first restrained, and then the property was used to secure the debt to Abizaid. This 
was also entirely appropriate because it was purchased with community funds. Appellant's 
claims, if there ever were any, were thus mooted. 
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The trial court ruled correctly. This court should affirm. 
S<3SLS> DATED thisgyU day of October, 1998. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -2034 
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Attorneys for Appellee Joanrje Schulman 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID WINTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLISON ABIZAID and 
JOANNE SCHULMAN, 
individually, 
Defendants. ] 
ALLISON ABIZAID, ] 
Cross-plaintiff, , 
vs. } 
JOANNE SCHULMAN, ) 
Cross-defendant. ) 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 
) DEFENDANT JOANNE SCHULMAN'S 
CROSS-MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 95 090 8521 PI 
1 Judge William A. Thome 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment, filed on or about December 1, 1997, and 
defendant Joanne Schulman's cross-motion for summary judgment were heard on March 19, 
1998. Plaintiff was represented by W. Kevin Jackson, of Jensen, Duffin, Carman, Dibb & 
Jackson, and defendant Schulman was represented by David C. Wright of Kruse, Landa & 
Maycock. The cross-motions for summary judgment were fully briefed. At the hearing, counsel 
for plaintiff stipulated that plaintiffs motion was to be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment rather than partial summary judgment as plaintiff was seeking only the relief requested 
in the motion and, if successful, would not pursue additional relief and that a ruling granting that 
motion would be treated as a final judgment on the merits. 
Having considered the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the parties, and for good 
cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied for the reasons 
contained in Schulman's memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion. It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, based on the undisputed facts as set 
forth in defendant Schulman's combined memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion and in 
support of her cross-motion, summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of Schulman as to 
each of plaintiffs claims. The court rules that, as a matter of law, there was no duty running 
between Schulman and plaintiff to support plaintiffs negligence claim. The court further rules 
as a matter of law that the necessary elements of a prior action in which plaintiff was a successful 
defendant is missing, and therefore summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiffs claim for 
abuse of process. The court further rules as a matter of law that Schulman is entitled to and is 
hereby granted summary judgment as to plaintiffs quiet title/slander of title/wrongful lien 
claims. Those claims were moot after the release of the lis pendens in the California proceedings 
referred to by the parties in their respective memoranda and when the California court issued its 
restraining order with respect to plaintiffs Utah property at issue in this action. This order 
constitutes a final judgment as to each of plaintiff s claims against Schulman. It is further 
ORDERED that each party will bear its own costs and attorneys fees incurred in this 
action. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of March, 1998. 
<z*K 
WILLIAM^. TH&R$£ 
DISTRICT COUR% JUDGE 
\ 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 
DEFENDANT JOANNE SCHULMAN'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to the following, postage prepaid, t h i s ^ _ day of March, 1998: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
Jensen, Duffin, Carman, Dibb & Jackson 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379 
